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Appellant, Ted Jay Adamson, pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits this Appeal Brief.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court Of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2) (h).

The order appealed from is a

final order disposing of all claims of all parties.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did

the trial court commit an error of law in deciding it

does not have jurisdiction and authority to modify the property
award in the parties' Decree of Divorce?
Did the trial court commit an error of law in failing to
distinguish that the benefits Respondent is currently receiving
are disability benefits and hence his separate property rather
than retirement benefits awarded in the decree?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Since a summary judgment is granted as a matter of law
rather than fact, the appellate court reviews the trial court's
conclusions for correctness and to determine whether there has
been an error of law, without according deference to the trial
court's legal conclusions. Barber

v. Farmers

248 (Utah Ct App. 1988); Bonham v. Morgan,
1989).

1

Ins.

Exch.

751 P.2d

788 P.2d 497 (Utah

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The determinative statutory authority for this appeal is
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(3).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of Case
This appeal is from a final order of the Second Judicial

District Court, Honorable Jon M. Memmott

granting the

Petitioner's Motion For Summary Judgment on Respondent's Petition
To Modify Decree of Divorce.
2.

Course of Proceedings
The parties were divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered by

the Second District Court on November 30, 1992. On January 29,
1998 Respondent filed a petition to modify the award of
retirement benefits based upon Respondent's severe disability
sustained subsequent to entry of the Decree of Divorce.
Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule
56(c) of Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure.
3.

Disposition in the Lower Court
The court granted Petitioner's motion for summary judgment,

ruling that, as a matter of law, Respondent was not entitled to
modification of the Decree.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The parties were divorced by a Decree of Divorce

entered by the Second District Court on November 30, 1992. The
Decree of Divorce was based upon a Stipulation and Property
Settlement Agreement signed by the parties. (Paragraph 1,
Statement of Facts of Respondent's Memorandum In Opposition To
Motion For Summary Judgment).
2.

In the Decree the Petitioner was awarded a one-half

(1/2) interest in Respondent's retirement benefits accrued during
the marriage. (Paragraph 2, Statement of Facts of Respondent's
Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment).
3.

At the time of the divorce, the Respondent was 42 years

old and worked as a licensed plumber. (Paragraph 3, Statement of
Facts of Respondent's Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For
Summary Judgment)
4.

At the time of the divorce, the Respondent did not

contemplate drawing on his retirement pension fund until he
retired at 62 years of age. (Paragraph 4, Statement of Facts of
Respondent's Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For Summary
Judgment)
5.

On May 1, 1995, Respondent, while working, fell two

3

stories onto cement and sustained a serious spinal cord injury.
Respondent does not have the use of his legs and is confined to a
wheel chair. The Respondent also has only limited use of his
arms. The Respondent is no longer capable of employment and is no
longer able to earn sufficient income to maintain his basic
living expenses. (Paragraph 5, Statement of Facts of Respondent's
Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment)
6.

In February, 1996, as a result of his disability, the

Respondent qualified for early payments from his retirement and
pension funds. He has been receiving $578.00 per month from the
Utah Pipe Trades Pension Trust Fund and $610.00 per month from
the Plumbers & Pipefitters National Pension Fund. These payments
will be made to the Respondent for the rest of his life. The
Respondent also is receiving Social Security disability payments.
(Paragraph 6, Statements of Facts of Respondent's Memorandum In
Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment)
7.

Had it not been for Respondent's unfortunate injuries,

the Respondent would not have been eligible to receive retirement
benefits from his retirement pension funds until he reached 62
years of age. (Paragraph 7, Statement of Facts, Respondent's
Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment)
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8.

Prior to the accident/ the Respondent was earning

$3,000.00 to $4,000.00 per month. (Paragraph 8, Statement of
Facts of Respondent's Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For
Summary Judgment)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Summary Judgment should be granted only when the evidence,
considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party,
demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. The lower court granted Petitioner's motion for summary
judgment on the basis that, as a matter of law, it could not
modify the property award to exclude Respondent's disability
payments from distribution in the Decree of Divorce. Hence,
Respondent never even got to the question of whether there had
been a change of circumstance since entry of the decree.

The

trial court simply ruled it did not have authority.
The applicable statute is clear that courts have continuing
jurisdiction to make subsequent changes in divorce decrees for
the distribution of property.

Moreover, the benefits that the

Respondent is currently receiving are disability benefits
and as such are not marital property subject to distribution in

5

the decree. It is submitted that the lower court erred in
granting Petitioner's motion for summary judgment and that as a
matter of law, the lower court has continuing jurisdiction to
modify the Decree of Divorce as requested by the Respondent. As
such the case should be remanded for a determination on the
threshold question as to whether there has been a substantial and
material change of circumstance.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
BASIS FOR REVIEW
Summary Judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c). In the
case at hand, the district court ruled that it did not, as a
matter of law, have the authority to modify the property division
in the decree, as requested by Respondent. The Respondent
contends the district court does have continuing
jurisdiction to modify property awards, to include the retirement
annuity.

6

POINT II
THE COURT HAS CONTINUING JURISDICTION TO MODIFY PROVISIONS IN A
DECREE OF DIVORCE REGARDING DIVSION OF PROPERTY
Case law, as well as state statute authorizes a court to
modify property distributions. Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5(3) provides
as follows:
The Court has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders for the custody
of the children and their support, maintenance,
health and dental care and for distribution of
the property and obligations for debts as is
reasonable and necessary, (emphasis added).
A trial court may modify the division of property in a
stipulated divorce decree under a showing of a substantial change
of circumstances since entry of the decree and not contemplated
in the decree itself Hill
1988); Whitehouse
1990); Williams
Sundquist

v. Hill,

v. Whitehouse,
v. Sherwood,

v. Sundquist,

968 P.2d 866 (Utah Ct. App.
790 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah Ct App

688 P.2d 475, 476 (Utah 1984);

639 P.d 181 (Utah 1981) (reallocation of

property rights in installment payments of income from real
property).
In McCrary v. McCrary,

599 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah 1979), the

Supreme Court stated the following
Under Utah law, a trial court granting a Decree of
Divorce is afforded considerable discretion in the area
of property distribution . . . the court has continuing
jurisdiction over the parties with regard to the
7

decree, enabling it to make subsequent modifications as
are equitable. The breadth of discretionary power given
the trial court in the initial determination of the
property division extends in equal measure to these
subsequent modifications.
In other cases the Utah Supreme Court has stated that, while
the court has continuing jurisdiction to modify property
settlements, such should be resorted to with "great reluctance
and for compelling reasons". Land v. Land 605 P.2d 1248, 1251
(Utah

1980); Whitehouse
In Whitehouse

v.

v. Whitehouse
Whitehouse,

supra

at 61.

the trial court modified the

distribution of equity in the marital home and timing of pay out
of a retirement program.
In the present case, at the time of entry of the decree, the
parties were contemplating that Petitioner would begin receiving
her share of Respondent's retirement benefits only when the
Respondent reached 62 years of age, the age when Respondent could
begin receiving retirement benefits under his retirement plan.
The parties did not contemplate any other circumstance wherein
Respondent would begin receiving benefits from his retirement
pension funds prior to Respondent reaching 62 years of age. The
decree is silent on this issue. The Respondent's injuries
subsequent to entry of the Decree were not contemplated by the
decree. The Respondent's severe and debilitating injuries
represent a substantial change in circumstances from the
circumstances that existed at the time the decree was entered. In
8

addition, Respondent's injuries represent a compelling reason for
the decree to be modified to provide for the circumstance that
the parties now find themselves in.
POINT III
THE BENEFITS THAT THE RESPONDENT IS CURRENTLY RECEIVING ARE
DISABILITY BENEFITS AND ARE NOT A MARTIAL ASSET SUBJECT TO
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION IN THE DECREE OF DIVORCE
The appellate courts in many states have held that
disability payments, intended to compensate the employee for lost
earning capacity, are not marital property subject to equitable
distribution between the parties in a divorce. Ciliberti
Ciliberti,
Allard,

v.

374 Pa.Super. 228, 542 A. 2d 580 (Pa.1988); Allard
708 A. 2d 554 (Rhode Island 1998;; In

Stenquist,

Re Marriage

v.

of

21 Cal.3d 779, 148 Cal. Rptr, 9, 582 P.2d 96 (Ca.

1978J; In Re Hoag, 122 Or. App 230, 857 P. 2d 208(Ore. 1993);
Queen v. Queen,
v. Avallone,
v. Freeman,

308 Md. 547, 521 A. 2d 370 (Md. 1987);

Avallone

275 NJ Super.575, 646 A. 2d 1121(N.J.1994); Freeman
4 68 So.2d 32 6 (Fla.1985); Courts have been willing

to look behind the labels of "retirement benefits" and
"disability benefits" to determine the true nature of the
benefits that are received by the recipient of the benefits.

Ciliberti
v. Avallone,

v. Ciliberti,
supra.

supra,

Allard

v. Allard,

supra;

Avallone

Retirement benefits are generally considered

deferred compensation for past service, and are therefore
9

considered to be a marital asset subject to distribution upon
dissolution of the marriage. Knies

v. Knies,

979 P. 2d 482

(Washington 1999). In contrast, disability benefits compensate
for lost earnings resulting from a diminished capacity to compete
in the employment market. Allard

v. Allard,

supra.

"Disability

benefits may serve multiple purposes. They may compensate for the
loss of earnings resulting from compelled premature retirement
and from a diminished ability to compete in the employment
market. Disability benefits may also serve to compensate the
disabled person for personal suffering caused by the disability."
Ciliberti

v.

Ciliberti,

Stenquist

supra,

supra,

at 233, quoting In Re Marriage

of

at 101.

As such, disability benefits are the injured party's sole
property and are not subject to distribution upon the dissolution
of the marriage.
Losses incurred after entry of final divorce, including
future loss of wages, future medical expenses and
future loss of earning capacity are the injured
spouse's separate property and not subject to equitable
distribution upon dissolution of the parties marriage.
Allard

vs. Allardf

supra.

In this matter, payments received by the Respondent are in
lieu of earnings that would have been paid to him if he had been
able to work.

Therefore, the payments received by the

Respondent are disability payments, and as such are the

10

Respondent's separate property and are not subject to
distribution to the Petitioner,
In Avallone,

supra

the husband had vested rights in a

retirement pension, but had not completed the necessary years of
service.

Therefore, his right to receive the retirement pension

had not matured.

The husband was eligible for retirement

benefits when he reached fifty five years of age, but was only
forty four years of age when he became disabled.

The court

ruled that payments to the husband were disability benefits, and
thus were not subject to division with the wife.
These facts are similar to the facts in this case.
Respondent would have been eligible to receive retirement
benefits twenty years after the disability occurred.

Therefore,

Respondent's rights to receive retirement benefits had not yet
matured when the disability occurred.

To allow the Petitioner

to share in the Respondent's disability benefits provides an
unexpected windfall for the Petitioner, and a financial hardship
for the Respondent.
Respondent is not seeking to divest the Petitioner of her
share in Respondent's actual retirement benefits.

Respondent

agrees that the Petitioner should share in the retirement
benefits as contemplated by the Decree, i.e., when the
Respondent reaches 62 years of age, and would be eligible for
retirement benefits according to the provisions of his

11

retirement plan.
CONCLUSION
The lower court erred in granting summary judgment to
Petitioner.

As a matter of law, Respondent's disability

benefits are not a marital asset subject to distribution with
Petitioner.

Therefore Respondent is entitled to modify the

Decree of Divorce to exclude Respondent's disability benefits
from distribution in the decree of divorce.
DATED this 2 9 * * day of June, 2000

O^r
Alan Rf Stuart
Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
CAROL LYNN ADAMSON,
Plaintiff,

]
l|

SUMMARY JUDGMENT DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO MODIFY
DECREE OP DIVORCE

vs.
TED JAY ADAMSON,
Defendant.

]|
*

Civil No. 9247001125 DA
Judge Jon M. Memmott

The hearing on Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
denying defendant's petition for modification of decree of
divorcer came on before the Honorable Jon M. Memmottf District
Judge, on Tuesday the 24th day of August, 1999*

Plaintiff

appeared in person and by counsel, George K. Fadel*
appeared in person and by counsel Alan R* Stewart-

Defendant
The Court

having read the memoranda filed by the parties and hearing the
arguments of counsel, and having heretofore made and entered
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and it appearing that
Summary Judgment should be entered pursuant to Rule 56, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, in that the pleadings, decree and other
information contained in the record show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the plaintiff is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, now therefor:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:

I

1.

The QUADRO as amended is res judicata as to the

entitlement of the parties to retirement benefits of the
defendantf and the Court is without jurisdiction to modify the
QUADRO as to the plaintiff's entitlement pursuant to the Decree
of Divorce entered in this cause.
2,

Summary Judgment is hereby entered denying the

defendant's motion to modify the decree of divorce*
3»

Ho costs are awarded either party.

Dated this

of September, 1999.
BY THE COURT

DISTRICT JUDGE

2

CERTIFICATE

OF .MAILING.

I certify that on the 26th day of August, 1999, I mailed
a copy of the Findings and Judgment relating no the petition for
modification of .the decreel of divorce to Mr. Alan R* Stewart,
attorney for the defendant-respondent,1366 East Murray-Holladay
Road, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117.

